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The Effects of Deliberative Polling in an EU-wide
Experiment: Five Mechanisms in Search of an
Explanation
DAVID SANDERS*
Deliberative Polls simulate public opinion in a given policy domain when members of the relevant
mass public are better informed about the issues involved. This article reports on the results of a three-
day Deliberative Poll, conducted before the June 2009 European Parliament elections, to evaluate the
effects of deliberation on a representative sample of EU citizens. Findings show that, compared with a
control group, deliberators changed their views signiﬁcantly on immigration (becoming more liberal),
climate change (becoming greener) and the EU itself (becoming more pro-European). Five different
explanations of why deliberation appears to work are tested: sampling bias, increased political
knowledge, discussion quality, small group social conformity pressure and the inﬂuence of other
Deliberative Poll actors, but none is satisfactory.
Deliberative Polls (DPs) aim to simulate what public opinion in a given policy domain
would be if members of the relevant mass public were better informed about the issues
involved. As such, DPs offer an important new mechanism for democratic practice, one
that has been adopted in a variety of institutional contexts crossnationally.1 The
procedures of DPs vary according to speciﬁc circumstances, but the general principles
involved are simple: (1) in the chosen issue domain, the state of opinion among the target
mass public is assessed; (2) a representative sample of that public is then invited to a
‘deliberative event’ at which the participants are exposed to ‘deliberation’ – to
information and debate about the issue(s) involved; and (3) opinion is re-assessed to
determine the extent to which the deliberative process might have changed people’s
views.2 The record of a growing number of DP events is that deliberation does indeed
change median opinions.3 The implication is that policy makers who wish to take note
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1 For speciﬁc examples, see Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Roger Jowell, ‘Considered
Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 455–87.
2 See James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997);
James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Bringing Deliberation to Democratic Dialogue’, in Maxwell
McCombs and Amy Reynolds, eds, A Poll with a Human Face (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999),
pp. 3–38; James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls: Aspirations and
Effects’, British Journal of Political Science, 36 (2006), 184–8.
3 See Jason Barabas, ‘How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions’, American Political Science Review,
98 (2004), 687–701; James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public
Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
of public opinion in arriving at their decisions might wish to take more notice of
post-deliberative, ‘informed’ opinion and less of the relatively ‘uninformed’ views of mass
publics that are typically expressed in other public opinion arenas.4
This article reports the results of a three-day Deliberative Poll, conducted in advance of
the June 2009 European Parliament elections, a poll or DP that sought to evaluate the
effects of deliberation on a representative sample of citizens of the European Union
(EU).5 This ‘Europolis’ Poll focused on two issues of relatively high salience according to
contemporary Eurobarometer polls: the question of extra-communitarian immigration
into the European Union and the need for policy makers seriously to confront the issue of
climate change. Participants in the DP were given brieﬁng materials in advance of the
event. At the event itself, they were given the opportunity to listen to, and to question,
politicians and experts in these two policy areas. These plenary sessions were followed by
small-group discussions. The views of ‘deliberators’ were measured both before and
immediately after the DP event and again some two months later. The results from this
‘test’ group were compared systematically with those of a ‘control’ group who did not
attend the DP event, but whose views were recorded at the same times as those of the test
group. These comparisons enable the estimation of the extent to which participation in
the DP affected participants’ attitudes towards immigration and climate change. Perhaps
more interestingly, however, they also allow for the analysis of the possible collateral
effects of DP participation on attitudes towards the European Union itself. The reported
ﬁndings show that participants in this EU-wide DP event developed more pro-EU
attitudes than their control group counterparts.
The key substantive question investigated here is why Deliberative Polling appears to
affect its participants directly and also collaterally. Five possible mechanisms – or
explanations – for these observed DP effects are examined: the possible ‘self-selection’
consequences of DP participation; changes in participants’ knowledge about the issues
involved; the quality of small-group discussions; the ‘social desirability’ effects of small-
group discussions; and the strength of the arguments articulated by other actors in the
deliberation process itself. These mechanisms have all been suggested in previous work on
deliberative polling.6 The results reported show that none of these explanations is compelling
or operates across all attitude/behaviour sets. Rather, the effects of DP are variegated and
inconsistent, with different factors affecting different individuals in different contexts.
Section 1 of the article outlines the precise design of the DP experiment conducted in
2009. It also summarizes the main theoretical ideas that underpin each of the mechanisms
that are hypothesized to produce the ‘deliberative poll effect’. Section 2 presents the mean
changes in opinion that occurred in the test and control groups in the period between
March and August 2009. The results show that across a wide range of attitudes, mean
opinion changed signiﬁcantly within the test group but not within the control group.
Section 3 speciﬁes and tests a series of individual-level multivariate panel models that
demonstrate the robustness of the DP effect across a range of different attitude domains.
4 John Gastil, By Popular Demand: Revitalising Representative Democracy through Deliberative
Elections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
5 The details of the Europolis project are described at http://www.europolis-project.eu/ and in
Pierangelo Isernia and Kaat Smets, ‘Democracy in Hard Times: Does Deliberation Affect Attitude
Strength’ (CIRCaP, University of Siena, Europolis Working Paper, 2010).
6 James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative
Polling and Public Opinion’, Acta Politica, 40 (2005), 284–98. See also Fishkin, When the People Speak.
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Section 4 develops and tests models that assess the role of the ﬁve mechanisms identiﬁed
above as possible explanations of the DP effect.
1. THE EXPERIMENTAL DELIBERATIVE POLL DESIGN AND POSSIBLE
EXPLANATIONS FOR DP EFFECTS
The core requirement of any experimental design is to ensure that a randomly selected
group of test participants can be compared systematically with members of an equivalent
control group who are not subjected to the experimental test. This condition was satisﬁed
in the present study by conducting two parallel panel surveys (see Table 1): one aimed
at recruiting participants in the DP event (initial N5 3,000) and the other aimed at
recruiting members of the control group (initial N5 1,300). Members of both groups were
recruited by telephone, using random digit dialling, in April 2009. The initial test and
control-group samples were based on national quotas in all EU member states and were
both designed to be representative of the EU population as a whole. A random subset of
the initial test group (N5 600) was invited to participate in the DP event. Some 348 of
these respondents attended the event.7 They constitute the DP test-group panel in the
analysis here. As Table 1 indicates, their views on a range of topics were ascertained on
four occasions: at the time of the recruitment interview (panel wave 15 t1); when they
arrived for the DP event (t2); at the end of the DP event (t3); and two months after the
European Parliament elections (t4). The views of members of the control-group panel were
gathered on two occasions: at the time of the recruitment interview (t1) and two months
after the European elections (t4). Of the original 1,300 respondents to the ﬁrst wave
control-group survey, some 729 responded at t4. These 729 respondents constitute the
control group analysed here. The analysis consists in making comparisons (a) across
panel waves within the test group panel and (b) between the changes in attitude that are
observed in the test and control groups over time. The core expectation is that, if
deliberation makes a difference, then the test group’s views – in contrast to those of the
control group – should change systematically across the four panel waves.
As noted above, the empirical analysis reported here – like many previous studies –
conﬁrms that ‘deliberation’ makes a difference to people’s views. Why should this be the
case? Extensive research has been conducted into the sources of political attitude change
TABLE 1 Timing of Interviews, Test- and Control-Group Panels
Wave 1
April 2009
Wave 2
23 May 2009
Wave 3
26 May 2009
Wave 4
August 2009
Test-Group Panel
(N5 348) t1 t2 t3 t4
Control-Group Panel
(N5 729) t1 * * t4
Note: Deliberative Polling Event: 29–31 May 2009. * Signiﬁes no interview conducted in
this wave.
7 Respondents’ expenses for attending the three-day DP event, which was held in a hotel on the
outskirts of Brussels, were fully reimbursed and a modest per diem fee was also paid. The event was
funded by the European Ccommunity under Framework Programme VI.
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over many decades.8 Aggregate time-series analyses show, for example, that average
support for the incumbent government tends to move in line with the performance of the
domestic economy.9 Individual-level survey-based analyses show that people’s attitudes
towards a wide range of political objects vary, inter alia, according to their changing life
circumstances, to their exposure to new social groups or to new messages that they receive
from the mass media and/or from friends and acquaintances.10 Political psychology
experiments show that attitude change in relation to a particular political object results
from a complex mixture of assessments of the object’s salience, rational evaluations of its
performance or consequences (which may include the use of heuristics or cognitive
shortcuts) and emotional reactions to it.11
One obvious difﬁculty associated with trying to assess the mechanisms of attitude
change in Deliberative Polls is that a DP event itself is not a laboratory-based experiment.
In the case of the Europolis Poll, 348 individuals were brought together for three days of
discussion about immigration and climate change. They participated both in small-group
discussions, in which (in groups of around twenty-ﬁve individuals) they were encouraged
to articulate their own views, and in plenary sessions, in which a variety of experts and
politicians stated their views and were questioned about the topics under consideration.12
8 See, for example, Philip E. Converse, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964)’, Critical
Review, 18 (2006); Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Phillip E. Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice:
Explorations in Poltical Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John Zaller, The Nature
and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Zaller and Stanley
Feldman, ‘A Simple Theory of the Survey Response’, American Political Science Review, 36 (1992), 579–616.
9 See, for example, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Democracies (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Helmut Norpoth, Michael Lewis-Beck and Jean Dominique
Lafay, eds, Economics and Elections: The Calculus of Support (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1991); Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. McKuen and James A. Stimpson, The Macro Polity (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Han Dorussen and Michael Taylor, eds, Economic Voting (London:
Routledge, 2002).
10 See, for example, Benjamin I. Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in
America’s Policy Preferences (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992); R. Michael Alvarez, Information
and Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm,
Hard Choices, Easy Answers (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Robert Huckfeldt and
John Sprague, Citizens, Politics and Social Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995); Richard E. Petty and Duane T. Wegener, ‘Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion
Variables’, in Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, eds, The Handbook of Social
Psychology, 4th edn (Boston, Mass.: McGraw Hill, 1998), pp. 323–90; Lawrence R. Jacobs, Fay Lomax
Cook and Michael X. Delli Carpini, Talking Together: Public Deliberation and Political Participation in
America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009).
11 Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); Jon A. Krosnick and Robert P. Abelson, ‘The Case for
Measuring Attitude Strength in Surveys’, in Judith M. Tanur, ed., Questions about Questions: Inquiries
into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1992), pp. 177–203; Richard E.
Petty and Jon A. Krosnick, Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum, 1995); Arthur Lupia and Matthew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens
Learn What They Really Need to Know? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); James H.
Kuklinski and Buddy Peyton, ‘Belief Systems and Political Decision Making’, in Russell J. Dalton and
Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds, Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), pp. 45–63.
12 Participants spoke and listened to the discussion in their own native language: simultaneous
translation was provided as necessary for all who required it. Note that the small group discussions
preceeded the plenary sessions. This allowed participants ﬁrst to debate the issues for themselves, and then
to seek further clariﬁcation or elucidation from specialists with different viewpoints in the plenaries.
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Participants were supplied with detailed brieﬁng materials both before and during the DP
event.13 They also discussed the DP topics (and presumably many other topics) in
informal social exchanges throughout the DP event. Given the impossibility of directly
observing the activities and responses of 348 individuals in all these contexts, we rely here
on their answers to survey questions (posed in waves 3 and 4) that sought to elicit their
reactions to different aspects of the DP event. Thus, for example, although we cannot
know for sure how much attention individuals paid to the brieﬁng materials they were
sent in advance of the event, we can use their responses to questions about roughly how
much of these materials they read as a broad guide to their actual consumption of them.
Similarly, we cannot ‘know’ how far a particular individual’s opinions were swayed by the
views of a particular expert or politician. Nonetheless, we can use participants’ responses
to questions about the usefulness in clarifying their thinking of different aspects of the DP
event in order to analyse the potential impact of each of these aspects on attitude change.
Bearing in mind this need to measure indirectly the underlying sources of any DP exposure
effects on attitude change, we consider ﬁve possible mechanisms or explanations. The ﬁrst
relates to the possible ‘selection bias’ of the individuals who constitute the test group – the
people who actually attended the DP event.14 We can, of course, check to see whether or not
members of the test group differed signiﬁcantly in their wave 1 attitudes and characteristics
from members of the control group. Indeed, this task is undertaken explicitly in Section 2.
What we cannot know is whether or not the sort of people who are prepared to give up a
weekend (albeit in a luxury hotel) deliberating about immigration and climate change are
intrinsically more susceptible to changing their minds about political matters than are people
who prefer to stay at home. The best we can do in these circumstances is, ﬁrst, to weight the
data as necessary so that the proﬁle of the test sample, on any relevant characteristics,
resembles the control sample as closely as possible; and, second, to control statistically for as
many possible extraneous inﬂuences on attitude change as we can. In short, although we
cannot test for selection bias effects directly, we can do so indirectly by testing to see if
weighting the data to the key characteristics of the control sample makes any difference to
any observed DP test effect. We can further mitigate any possible effects of selection bias by
incorporating potentially confounding exogenous variables into any models that seek to
estimate the size and signiﬁcance of the ‘deliberation effect’. Tests of this sort are undertaken
explicitly in Sections 3 and 4.
The four other possible explanations for any observed DP test effect can be investigated
rather more directly. A second mechanism that could conceivably account for DP attitude
change is the acquisition of greater political knowledge, which could in principle change either
an individual’s assessment of the importance of a given issue or the position on that issue that
she/he adopts.15 The suggestion that increased knowledge of a particular policy domain should
be associated with an increased sense of its importance or salience seems fairly unexceptional.
However, in relation to the possible role of political knowledge in attitude position change, two
rival hypotheses present themselves. The ﬁrst derives from cognitive mobilization theory.16
13 All materials supplied are available at the website cited in fn. 5.
14 J. Heckman, ‘Sample Selection Bias as a Speciﬁcation Error’, Econometrica, 47 (1979), 153–61.
15 See Scott L. Althaus, ‘Information Effects in Collective Preferences’, American Political Science
Review, 92 (1998), 545–58; Jason Barabas, ‘How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions’, American Political
Science Review, 98 (2004), 687–701.
16 Ronald Inglehart, ‘The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial
Societies’, American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), 991–1017; Ronald Inglehart, The Silent
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The core claim is that increased political knowledge, other things being equal, serves to make
people more post-materialist – more tolerant and cosmopolitan – in their general outlook. In
terms of the experiment conducted here, this in turn implies that increased political knowledge
as a result of DP exposure should render participants more liberal in terms of immigration,
greener in terms of climate change and more pro-EU in terms of general European
orientations. In short, there should be a positive correlation between increased knowledge and
cosmopolitan attitudes. The second – counter-hypothesis – derives from Zaller’s ﬁnding that
increases in political knowledge can serve to reinforce existing attitudes rather than to change
them.17 The implication here, for example, is that (a) cosmopolitan individuals who acquire
greater relevant knowledge will tend to become more convinced cosmopolitans, while (b) non-
cosmopolitans in similar circumstances will tend to become more non-cosmopolitan. This in
turn implies that, in ‘mixed’ groups such as those considered here, the effects of (a) and (b) will
probably cancel each other out, producing no observable overall effect of increased knowledge
on cosmopolitan attitudes.
In order to test these various knowledge-related hypotheses, the same battery of political
knowledge questions was presented to DP participants in all four interview waves and to the
control group in the wave 1 and wave 4 interviews. The items covered both speciﬁc knowledge
about each of the two deliberative issues discussed – immigration and climate change – and
also, given that the Poll was conducted at the time of European Parliament elections, about
more general knowledge of the institutions of the European Union. It is a relatively
straightforward task to ascertain whether or not increases in political knowledge were
associated with attitude change and whether or not any knowledge effects were restricted
solely to the DP test group. The relevant ﬁndings are reported in Sections 2 and 4 below.
A third mechanism that could underpin any DP-induced attitude change relates to the
quality of the organized small-group discussions that took place among respondents.
Deliberation is intrinsically a process that requires full consideration of the relevant ideas
and issues that constitute and surround a given policy arena.18 All of the discussion groups
at the DP event were chaired by experienced moderators who had been trained to maximize
the fullest possible deliberation in each group. This said, it was inevitable that there would
be some variation across discussion groups in terms of the quality of the discussion or
deliberation. Respondents were asked to rate the quality of the small-group deliberation on a
number of criteria. By calculating the average scores on these rating scales for each discussion
group, we can estimate the intersubjective quality of the deliberation in each group. If the
quality of deliberation affects the extent of attitude change, then we would expect to ﬁnd that
attitude change is greater (or less) in those groups where, on average, the participants thought
that the discussion quality was higher (or lower).19 This hypothesis is also tested in Section 4.
(F’note continued)
Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1977).
17 Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.
18 James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative
Polling and Public Opinion’, Acta Politica, 40 (2005), 284–98; Diana C. Mutz, Hearing the Other Side:
Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also
Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1996).
19 This use of aggregated intersubjective measures of discussion quality here is the result of necessity
rather than choice. One important part of the Europolis DP project was the construction of objective
measures of discussion quality based on content analyses of the actual discussion sessions. Unfortunately,
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A fourth possible mechanism of attitude change under deliberation relates to social
desirability. Social desirability pressures are known to produce a range of responses in
face-to-face survey interviews and in small-group situations.20 In interviews, respondents
will sometimes give responses that they think they ‘ought’ to give or that they believe the
interviewer ‘expects’ of them. In small groups, some participants may adjust their views
on a particular topic in order to bring them into line with what they perceive to be
majority opinion within the group. In extremis, this kind of thinking produces the well-
known ‘groupthink’ phenomenon, in which members of a group converge on a single view
of a key problem and fail to articulate plausible criticisms of it.21 It is clearly possible that
social desirability pressures, notwithstanding the core intentions of the deliberative
process, could have similar effects in DP small groups. This would imply a sort of
regression to the mean over time: individuals who score more highly than the relevant
small-group mean on a given attitude scale at wave 1 would be expected to shift their
positions on the scale downwards by wave 4; those below the small group mean would be
expected to shift their positions upwards. This in turn implies that, for any given attitude
dimension, a variable that measures each respondent’s position as a deviation from the
small-group mean at wave 1 should have a positive effect on the change in the attitude
between waves 1 and 4. Again, this idea is tested explicitly in Section 4.
A ﬁnal mechanism that could induce attitude change under deliberation is the simple
power of argumentation to which participants are subjected. In normative terms, this
should be the core mechanism through which opinion change occurs.22 Deliberation
should engender changes of mind in particular individuals because they are now
convinced by arguments either that they had not heard before or that they now, having
been subjected to a new, more lucid exposition, ﬁnd more compelling. The immediate
difﬁculty here, of course, is specifying criteria that might enable a ‘compelling’ argument
to be distinguished from a ‘non-compelling’ one. Nonetheless, although we cannot
measure ‘argument strength’ objectively, it is possible to use participants’ perceptions of
the usefulness of different aspects of the DP process for clarifying their own thinking on
key issues. In this respect, participants in the event were asked to rate four different
aspects of the DP process on 0–10 scales, where zero denoted ‘a complete waste of time’
and 10 denoted ‘extremely useful’. These aspects were: reading the brieﬁng documentation
provided; listening to ‘experts’; listening to ‘politicians’; and ‘talking to other participants
outside the formal discussions’. By considering participants’ own estimates of the utility
of each aspect for clarifying their thinking, an assessment can be made of the extent to
which participants felt that the arguments articulated in these different vehicles were
compelling for them. The empirical implication is that the more (or less) an individual
(F’note continued)
ﬁnancial constraints on the project meant that it was possible to produce objective measures of
deliberation quality for only seven of the twenty-ﬁve discussion groups. Moreover, these groups were
restricted to a limited set of languages and, therefore, cannot be regarded as representative of the full
range of deliberation discussion that took place. In addition, to have objective data on only seven groups
does not provide sufﬁcient cases for a robust analysis of the effects of objective discussion quality to be
undertaken. In these circumstances, I reluctantly restrict the analysis of ‘deliberation quality’ to
subjective, as opposed to objective, measures.
20 R. J. Fisher, ‘Social Desirability Bias and the Validity of Indirect Questioning’, Journal of Consumer
Research, 20 (1993), 303–15.
21 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1972).
22 Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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found a particular vehicle useful for clarifying her/his thinking, the more (or less) likely
she/he is to change her/his views on any given attitude dimension. Again, this claim is
tested explicitly in Section 4.
2. DESCRIBING THE DP EFFECT: CHANGES IN TEST- AND CONTROL-GROUP
OPINIONS ACROSS INTERVIEW WAVES
As noted above, the Europolis Deliberative Poll experiment focused on two core issues:
immigration from outside the European Union and climate change. Each of these issues
was measured in terms of both salience and position. Salience was assessed by asking
respondents to rate the importance of each issue on a 0–10 scale.23 Position on
immigration was measured by combining the responses to a range of questions that sought
to establish the respondent’s degree of tolerance (on a 0–10 scale) towards immigrants.24
Position on climate change was assessed by asking respondents to place themselves on a
0–10 scale where high values denoted support for strong measures to combat climate
change even if this damages economic growth, and low values denoted support for
promoting economic growth even if it hurt efforts to combat climate change.25 Table 2
reports mean values on these four sets of measures for both the test panel and the control
panel. For the test group, means are reported for waves 1 through 4. For the control
group, they are reported for waves 1 and 4 only, as the control group was not interviewed
in waves 2 and 3. The table also reports the probability values for difference of means
t-tests. For each attitude measure, these t-tests make three sets of comparisons: between
test and control groups means at wave 1; between test group means at waves 1 and 4; and
between control group means at waves 1 and 4.
Several important patterns are revealed by the table. First, the scores for the test group
on all four measures increase signiﬁcantly between waves 1 and 4. For example, the mean
score on the pro-immigration index increases from 5.47 to 5.79 (p5 0.002), and the mean
on the climate importance score increases from 7.53 to 8.26 (p5 0.000). Second, the test
group scores all increase progressively during the actual test exposure – from wave 1 to
wave 2 and from wave 2 to wave 3. Three of the scores then decline slightly from wave 3
to wave 4 (the exception being the pro-immigration index, which continues to rise slightly
through to wave 4), suggesting that the test effect tends to decay only moderately after the
DP event. A third feature of the table is that, while the changes in the test-group mean
scores between waves 1 and 4 are all signiﬁcant, the changes in the control-group mean
scores with one exception are not. Although the control group ‘Combat Climate Change’
index changes signiﬁcantly between waves 1 and 4 (p5 0.027), the changes in the three
23 The question used was: ‘On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘‘no problem at all’’, 10 is ‘‘the most
serous problem we face’’, and 5 is ‘‘exactly in the middle’’ how serious a problem or not would you say
[immigration/climate change] is?’
24 The Pro-immigration index was constructed, after extensive dimensional testing, as a 0–10 constant
range scale from twelve questions that sought to measure respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants to
the European Union. Details on index construction are available from the author on request.
25 The combat climate change scale was based on the question: ‘On a scale from 0–10, where 0 means
that we should do everything possible to combat climate change even if that hurts the economy, 10 means
that we should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat
climate change and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven’t
you thought much about that?’ The ordering of the scale was reversed so that a high score signiﬁed a more
pro-environmental position.
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TABLE 2 Changes in Core Immigration and Climate Change Attitude Mean Scores, Wave 1 to Wave 4
Mean score Difference of means t-test p-value
Range
Test
Group
Control
Group
Test versus Control
Group, w1
Test Group
w1-w4
Control Group
w1-w4
Pro-Immigration Index 0–10 0.000 0.002 0.706
Wave 1 5.47 5.08
Wave 2 5.56
Wave 3 5.64
Wave 4 5.79 5.10
Immigration Importance 0–10 0.187 0.000 0.925
Wave 1 5.35 5.60
Wave 2 6.12
Wave 3 6.57
Wave 4 5.97 5.61
Combat Climate Index 0–10 0.104 0.004 0.027
Wave 1 5.87 5.56
Wave 2 6.29
Wave 3 6.65
Wave 4 6.32 5.80
Climate Importance 0–10 0.807 0.000 0.161
Wave 1 7.53 7.49
Wave 2 7.94
Wave 3 8.31
Wave 4 8.26 7.62
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remaining measures all fail to achieve signiﬁcance at conventional levels. The crucial point
here is that this pattern of signiﬁcant change in the test group and (generally) non-
signiﬁcant change in the control group strongly conﬁrms the idea that the Deliberative
Poll experience did have a powerful effect on participants’ opinions. Test-group subjects
on average became more liberal on immigration (mean increase: 5.47 to 5.79); increased
their average rating of the importance of both immigration and climate change (which
increased, respectively, from 5.35 to 5.97 and from 7.53 to 8.26); and became more
convinced of the need to combat climate change even at the expense of economic growth
(mean change: 7.53 to 8.26). The ﬁnal feature of Table 2 that merits attention is the
comparison between the average test-group and control-group scores at wave 1. The
difference of means tests here indicate that in relation to three of the measures (the two
importance measures and the combat climate change index), the test- and control-group
means are statistically indistinguishable. This said, the test group is more liberal on
immigration at wave 1 than the control group (5.47 in comparison with 5.08; p5 0.000),
implying that the test- and control-group panels may differ from each other in important
ways. This possibility is considered explicitly in Section 3 below.
It is clear from Table 2 that exposure to deliberation affected the immigration and
climate-change attitudes of the test-group panel respondents. Given that test respondents
spent three days explicitly discussing these two core issues, these manifest effects of
deliberation are perhaps unsurprising. It is possible, however, that a deliberative poll
that brings together participants from all over the European Union could also have
important latent effects on people’s attitudes. Simply exposing people to others from
other parts of the Union in a friendly and relaxed atmosphere could ‘collaterally’ change
people’s perceptions of the European Union itself. Table 3 reports on the equivalent
changes for collateral effects on EU-related attitudes. The table distinguishes between
four different sets of EU-related attitudes:26 people’s sense of European identity;27 their
preferences for EU policy competence or ‘policy scope’;28 their degree of satisfaction with
EU-level democracy;29 and their overall evaluations of the European Union as a whole.30
The results are very similar to those observed in Table 2. First, on three out of four of the
26 These measures are not highly intercorrelated. The highest bivariate correlation is r 5 0.36. This
reinforces the idea that the measures reﬂect distinct sets of attitudes towards Europe. This interpretation is
supported by extensive dimensional analysis of EU-related attitudes reported in David Sanders, Paolo
Bellucci, Mariano Torcal and Ga´bor To´ka, eds, The Europeanization of National Polities? Citizenship and
Support in a Post Enlargement Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 forthcoming).
27 The EU identity measure was taken from responses to the question: ‘On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
is ‘‘not at all’’, 10 is ‘‘completely’’, and 5 is exactly in the middle, how much would you say you think of
yourself as European?’
28 The EU Policy Scope measure was constructed additively from questions which asked respondents’
preferences for EU-level (as opposed to national or regional level) decision making in four policy areas –
‘ﬁghting unemployment’, ‘climate change’, ‘immigration policy’ and ‘ﬁght against crime’.
29 The EU Democracy Satisfaction or ‘EU Representation’ measure was constructed from responses
to: ‘On the whole, how satisﬁed or not are you with the way democracy works in the European Union?’
Response options were Very Satisﬁed, Somewhat Satisﬁed, Neither Satisﬁed nor Dissatisﬁed, Dissatisﬁed,
Very Dissatisﬁed.
30 The EU Evaluations index combined responses to two questions: ‘(1) Generally speaking, do you
think that [country’s] membership of the European Union is a Very Good Thing, a Fairly Good Thing,
Neither Good nor Bad, a Fairly Good Thing, A Very Bad thing; (2) On a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means
that [country] has ‘‘not beneﬁted at all’’ from being a member of the EU, 10 means ‘‘has beneﬁted
enormously’’, and 5 is ‘‘exactly in the middle’’, using this scale, would you say that on balance [country]
has beneﬁted or not from being a member of the EU?’
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TABLE 3 Changes in ‘Collateral’ EU-Related Attitude Mean Scores, Wave 1 to Wave 4
Mean score Difference of means t-test p-value
Range
Test
Group
Control
Group
Test versus Control
Group, w1
Test Group
w1-w4
Control
Group w1-w4
European Identity 0–10 0.072 0.007 0.533
Wave 1 7.11 6.76
Wave 4 7.53 6.83
EU Policy Scope 0–4 0.536 0.367 0.277
Wave 1 1.58 1.53
Wave 4 1.64 1.48
EU Representation 0–4 0.432 0.011 0.570
Wave 1 2.11 2.06
Wave 4 2.25 2.08
EU Evaluations 0–10 0.024 0.000 0.248
Wave 1 4.68 4.47
Wave 4 4.99 4.53
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measures (the exception is EU Evaluations), the wave 1 test-group mean is indistinguishable
from the wave 1 control-group mean. Second, for the test group, the average change
between wave 1 and wave 4 is generally signiﬁcant (the only exception is in relation to EU
Policy Scope). In contrast, for the control group, there is no signiﬁcant change between
waves 1 and 4. This again supports the idea of a Deliberative Poll effect: opinion in the
test panel, exposed to deliberation, changes and opinion in the control panel, not so
exposed, does not.
Overall, two general conclusions are suggested by the results presented in Tables 2
and 3. First, across both tables there is evidence of some sort of test-exposure effect. In
both tables, the test-group mean scores tend to increase signiﬁcantly, whereas the control-
group scores tend either to fall or not to change at all. This is clear evidence of a
Deliberative Poll or DP effect. Second, with a relatively small number of exceptions, at
wave 1, the test and control panels were indistinguishable from each other on most of the
measures reported. This suggests that the test and control panels were fundamentally
similar, with the implication that any observed test effect is due to the operation of the test
stimulus (the DP event) rather than the result of sampling bias. This said, the ‘relatively
small number of exceptions’ suggests the need for continuing caution about the direct
comparablility of the test and control samples. Appropriate controls are accordingly
introduced in the analysis reported here later.
3. TESTING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE DP EFFECT: SPECIFYING AND ESTIMATING
MULTIVARIATE MODELS
It is clear from the results reported above that the views of the participants in the
Europolis Deliberative Poll changed much more than those of the non-participant control
group: the simple experimental control of exposure to deliberation did change the way
people thought across a range of different issues. In addition to this experimental control,
however, it is also possible to apply non-experimental controls – to use multivariate
statistical controls to test the robustness of the bivariate relationships that have thus far
been described. The general form of the model employed to test the robustness of the
bivariate DP effect is
Yt ¼ aþ b0Yt1 þ SðbkXktÞ þ bjTestþ uit; ð1Þ
where Yt is the dependent variable attitude measured at wave 4; Yt21 is the lagged
dependent variable measured at wave 1; Xkt is a set of independent control variables
measured at wave 1; Test is a dummy variable, where 1 indicates membership of the DP
test group and 0 membership of the control group; and uit is a random error term.
Table 4 provides an illustration of this model speciﬁcation and the general set of control
variables that were employed. The dependent variable in the table is the respondent’s
score at wave 4 on the pro-immigration index described earlier. The inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation effectively means that the
(weighted) change in pro-immigration attitudes between waves 1 and 4 is being modelled.
The larger (or smaller) this coefﬁcient is, the more (or less) stable the measured dependent
variable attitude is between waves 1 and 4. There are no general expectations about the
signs or signiﬁcance levels of the coefﬁcients on the independent control variables. They
are included because any or all of them could in principle have effects on the change in the
dependent variable. They thus include controls for gender, age, education, class, religion,
religiosity, feelings of national identity, left–right ideology (including a term for left–right
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ideology squared to incorporate the possibility that the effects of ideology may be non-linear),
and party preference (to take account of the possibility that, over and above any effects of
ideology, the cues provided by either left-leaning or right-leaning parties might affect
attitude change). The key theoretical expectation for the model reported in Table 4 is that
the coefﬁcient for the Test variable will be positive and signiﬁcant. If this expectation is
fullﬁlled, it suggests that the DP test effect is sufﬁciently robust to withstand these various
non-experimental controls – that the test effect endures even when there is control for
these other possible inﬂuences on attitude change.
The results reported in Table 4 are reassuring. First, the coefﬁcient on the lagged
dependent variable is relatively high (b5 0.69), suggesting that, although there is some
change in pro-immigration attitudes across waves, these attitudes are also fairly stable.
Second, only two of the control variables are signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The
positive coefﬁcient on the education term (b5 0.09) indicates that more educated
respondents were slightly more likely to become more pro-immigration across waves. The
negative coefﬁcient on the left–right scale term (b520.13) implies that more right-wing
respondents were less likely to become more pro-immigration than their more left-wing
counterparts. The remaining control variables all yield non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcients,
suggesting that these other variables had no effects on the change in pro-immigration
attitudes between waves 1 and 4. Third, the model is reasonably well determined, with an
adjusted r25 0.52, although this is to be expected, given the inclusion of the lagged
TABLE 4 Model of Change in Pro-Immigration Position Score, Wave 1 to Wave 4
Coeff. Std Prob.
Pro-Immigration Position Score, wave 1 (0–10) 0.69 0.03 0.000
Male/not (0/1) 20.03 0.07 0.641
Age Category (1–6) 20.02 0.02 0.476
Education (1–4) 0.09 0.04 0.021
Catholic/not (0/1) 0.01 0.08 0.947
Protestant/not (0/1) 20.04 0.11 0.710
Working Class/not (0/1) 20.13 0.08 0.108
Religiosity (1–3) 20.01 0.08 0.933
National Identity (0–10) 20.01 0.01 0.494
Left–Right Position (0–10) 20.13 0.04 0.004
Left–Right Squared 0.01 0.01 0.082
Left Party Grouping/not (0/1) 20.04 0.09 0.693
Right Party Grouping/not (0/1) 20.11 0.09 0.198
Test Exposure – deliberation/not (0/1) 0.38 0.07 0.000
Constant 2.02 0.30 0.000
N 1,077
Adjusted R2 0.52
Notes: Dependent Variable: Pro-Immigration Position Score, Wave 1. All independent
variables measured at Wave 1. Age categories are: 18–25; 26–35; 36–45; 46–55; 56–65; 651.
Religiosity based on frequency of attendance at religious services. Education is based on years
in education: up to 15; 16–18; 19–24; 241. National Identity is respondent’s self-placement on
a 0–10 scale. Left–Right Position is respondent’s self-placement on a 0–10 scale. Left (Right)
Party Grouping indicates whether or not, in Wave vote intention, the respondent speciﬁed a
party that was part of a left (right) of centre grouping in the European Parliament. Left groups
were deﬁned as: PES, Far Left or Green; Right groups as EPP Far Right or Libertas; the
Control category was Other/None.
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endogenous variable. The key ﬁnding of the table, however, relates to the coefﬁcient for
the Test term. This is, as expected, both positive and highly signiﬁcant. Controlling for all
the other variables in the model, exposure to deliberation still exerts a large, signiﬁcant
effect on people’s attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, the coefﬁcient of b5 0.38
(p5 0.000) indicates that, in comparison with the control group, those exposed to
deliberation on average increased their scores on the 0–10 pro-immigration index by 0.38
of a point between waves 1 and 4.
Table 5 reports the consequences of estimating a series of models, based on the
speciﬁcation described in Equation 1 and Table 4, for each of the dependent variables
identiﬁed in Tables 2 and 3. The results conﬁrm that the inferences about the DP test
effect on pro-immigration attitudes drawn from Table 5 can be generalized both to the
remaining core attitudes towards immigration and climate change and also to three of
the four collateral EU attitude sets. With the exception of attitudes towards EU Policy
Scope (which in any case, as seen in Table 3, produced no bivariate test effect), all of the
Test coefﬁcients retain their signiﬁcance in the face of extensive multivariate controls.
These ﬁndings strongly support the idea that Deliberative Polls do change people’s
attitudes – both in relation to the core issues that are explicitly being deliberated upon but
also, in this case, in relation to collateral attitudes relating to the European Union as
a whole.31
TABLE 5 Signiﬁcance of Test Effect in Multivariate Models of Change in Core and
Collateral Dependent Variables, Wave1 to Wave 4
Test vs Control Effect (0/1)
Coeff. Std Prob.
Core Attitude Change Model
Pro-Immigration Position Index Model (0–10) 0.38 0.07 0.000
Immigration Importance Model (0–10) 0.54 0.16 0.001
Combat Climate Change Position Model (0–10) 0.37 0.16 0.020
Climate Change Importance Model (0–10) 0.62 0.12 0.000
Collateral EU-Attitude Change Model
European Identity (0–10) 0.44 0.14 0.002
EU Policy Scope (0–10) 0.11 0.07 0.162
EU Representation (0–4) 0.14 0.06 0.016
EU Evaluations (0–4) 0.78 0.10 0.000
31 This strong collateral effect on EU attitudes was not observed in the only other EU-wide deliberative
poll that has been conducted – Tomorrow’s Europe (see http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/eu/ Tomorrow’s
Europe: the ﬁrst EU wide Deliberative Poll). One possible explanation for the difference in these two sets
of DP ﬁndings could derive from the differential character of the issues debated. In the Europolis poll
covered here, the issues of immigration and climate change perhaps intrinsically lend themselves to
EU-wide solutions and accordingly invoked a more pro-EU response among participants. In contrast, the
Tomorrow’s Europe DP focused on Turkey’s entry into the European Union. This could have served to
focus participants’ attention to the difﬁculties likely to confront EU citizens in the future, which in turn
could have invoked less cosmopolitan attitudes among the Tomorrow’s Europe participants. A second
possibility is that the set of EU attitude measures employed in the Europolis event were more
comprehensive than those used in Tomorrow’s Europe. Future studies should enable these potential
factors to be considered more explicitly.
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4. WHY DO DELIBERATIVE POLLS CHANGE PEOPLE’S ATTITUDES?
The results presented in the two previous sections show that there is a clear Deliberative
Poll effect. In Section 1, a series of possible mechanisms were advanced that might help to
explain why this effect occurs. This section develops and tests models that seek to assess
the possible role played by these various mechanisms in generating the DP effect.
The ﬁrst possible mechanism investigated here can be summarized under the general
heading of the ‘the effects of (self) selection bias’. The idea here is that any observed DP
effect is not really the result of actual deliberation. Rather, it reﬂects the fact that the type
of person who allows herself or himself to be exposed to a DP is a priori more likely to
change her or his views on any given issue compared with someone who is not interested
in participating in a DP. Thus, if the test group changes its views during its deliberation
more than the control group does during its non-deliberation, than this is not because of
the deliberation itself. If the non-deliberators had somehow been induced to deliberate,
they would not necessarily have changed their views under deliberation in the same way as
the deliberators did. This claim obviously cannot be tested directly. However, it is possible
to use information about the test- and control-group samples to weight the test-group
cases so that, as far as possible, the proﬁle of the test group – in terms of both
demographics and key attitudes that are not being used as dependent variables – matches
that of the control group. Using this weighted version of the test-group data, we can
simulate how the test group would have behaved if, counterfactually, they had possessed
the same demographic and attitudinal proﬁle as the control group. Although not the same
as subjecting the non-deliberators to deliberation, it is nevertheless the nearest that we can
get to the counterfactual position.
Is such a weighting justiﬁed? And if so, how should it be effected? It will be recalled
from Tables 2 and 3 that there were certain respects in which the test- and control-group
samples at wave 1 were signiﬁcantly different from one another: in Table 2, in terms of
pro-immigration attitudes; and in Table 3, in terms of EU Evaluations. In addition, t-test
results (not reported) comparing the demographic proﬁles of the test and control groups
showed that they were signiﬁcantly different from one another in terms of interest in
politics, political knowledge, gender and education (the test group being disproportionately
interested, knowledgeable, female and well educated). Making decisions about how to weight
data is always a difﬁcult process. If too many weighting variables are used, then the analytic
results can become unstable because of the excessive overweighting assigned to particular
individuals. If too few are used, then the proﬁle of the weighted sample fails to correspond
sufﬁciently to the target sample. It is also standard practice to avoid applying weights
determined by the dependent variable. Here, we report the consequences of weighting the test
group data by the three (non-dependent) variables that displayed the greatest differences
between the test and the control groups: interest in politics, gender and education.32
Tables 6 and 7 report the equivalent ﬁndings to those outlined in Tables 4 and 5,
but with the data weighted by interest, gender and education. The estimated models also
take account of the clustering of the data that is implied by the separate collection of the
test- and control-group samples. Table 6 indicates the consequences of weighting and
clustering the model shown in Table 4. The results show that the two independent
variables that were signiﬁcant in Table 4 model (left–right ideology and education) are
no longer signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The core results, however, are very similar to
32 Other weighting combinations in fact produced similar results to those reported here.
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those reported in Table 4. The coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent variable and on the
Test variable are both positive and signiﬁcant. This again suggests that, in spite of
weighting and clustering, actual participation in the DP event was crucial in changing
opinions on the pro-immigration index between waves 1 and 4. A similar set of general
conclusions is in order in relation to Table 7. As in Table 4, the results in Table 7 show
TABLE 6 Model of Change in Pro-Immigration Position Score, Wave 1 to Wave 4:
Data Weighted and Clustered to Take Account of Possible Selection Bias
Coeff. Robust Std Prob.
Pro-Immigration Position Score, wave 1 (0–10) 0.66 0.04 0.000
Male/not (0/1) 20.02 0.10 0.867
Age Category (1–6) 20.02 0.02 0.527
Education (1–4) 0.11 0.07 0.367
Catholic/not (0/1) 0.01 0.08 0.951
Protestant/not (0/1) 20.07 0.14 0.695
Working Class/not (0/1) 20.14 0.05 0.202
Religiosity (1–3) 0.02 0.10 0.846
National Identity (0–10) 20.01 0.01 0.712
Left–Right Position (0–10) 20.14 0.01 0.066
Left–Right Squared 0.01 0.00 0.076
Left Party Grouping/not (0/1) 20.05 0.12 0.757
Right Party Grouping/not (0/1) 20.15 0.03 0.112
Test Exposure – deliberation/not (0/1) 0.41 0.00 0.002
Constant 2.12 0.16 0.047
Weighted N 1,076
Adjusted R2 0.50
Note: Data weighted by Gender, Interest in Politics and Education. Standard errors adjusted
for two clusters (one test; one control) in sample. Dependent Variable: Pro-Immigration
Position Score, Wave 1. All other variables as deﬁned in Table 4.
TABLE 7 Signiﬁcance of Test Effect in Multivariate Models of Change in Core and
Collateral Dependent Variables, Wave1 to Wave 4: Data Weighted and
Clustered to Take Account of Possible Selection Bias
Test vs Control Effect (0/1)
Coeff. Std Prob.
Core Attitude Change Models
Pro-Immigration Position Index Model (0–10) 0.41 0.00 0.002
Immigration Importance Model (0–10) 0.60 0.02 0.022
Combat Climate Change Position Model (0–10) 0.44 0.01 0.018
Climate Change Importance Model (0–10) 0.67 0.01 0.007
Collateral EU-Attitude Change Models
European Identity (0–10) 0.52 0.02 0.018
EU Policy Scope (0–10) 0.11 0.02 0.092
EU Representation (0–4) 0.16 0.01 0.017
EU Evaluations (0–4) 0.79 0.04 0.030
Note: Data weighted by Gender, Interest in Politics and Education. Robust Standard Errors
adjusted for two clusters (one test; one control) in sample.
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that the Test coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and positive in all the attitude models except for
EU Policy Scope. The clear implication of all this is that weighting and clustering the
data make no difference to the quasi-ubiquity of the DP Test effect. This in turn suggests
that the DP effect cannot be plausibly explained by the distinctive character of the test
group. In sum, (self) selection bias appears to be an unconvincing explanation of the DP
Test effect or, at a minimum, an explanation that is ‘not proven’.
The analysis conducted so far has involved making either explicit or implicit
comparisons between test- and control-group respondents. It has been established that
there is a clear DP effect and that that effect is not explained by the composition of the
test-group sample. In examining other possible explanations for the DP effect, the
analysis now focuses solely on the test group. It will be recalled from Section 1 that four
putative mechanisms underlying deliberators’ changing views mechanisms were
hypothesized to operate in this context, as follows:
— Increased political knowledge. This was measured as the change in an individual’s
knowledge quiz score (minimum score5 0; maximum5 6) between waves 1 and 4. As
noted in Table 2, it is clear that, while political knowledge increased signiﬁcantly among
test-group respondents, among the control group it changed barely at all. Recall that one
background ‘salience’ hypothesis and two rival ‘position’ hypotheses are of relevance if
greater political knowledge represents a mechanism through which the DP effect operates.
The salience hypothesis is simply that greater knowledge of an issue induces people to
attribute greater importance to it. The ﬁrst position hypothesis (based on Inglehart’s work)
is that increased knowledge should make people more tolerant on immigration, more
inclined to support measures to combat climate change, more likely to regard immigration
and climate change as important and more sympathetic towards the European Union. In
short, changes in knowledge should exert signiﬁcant, positive effects on each of our core-
and collateral-dependent variables. The second position hypothesis (based on Zaller’s
work), in contrast, suggests that the reinforcement effects of greater knowledge should
cancel each other out and that knowledge change should accordingly have no effect on our
core- and collateral-independent variables.
— Small-group discussion quality. The twin assumptions here are that average perceptions
of the quality of discussion can be used as a surrogate for the actual quality of the
small-group discussions at the DP event, and that the quality of discussion, thus
measured, can be used to assess the quality of deliberation. It is hypothesized that, if
discussion quality is one of the mechanisms through which the DP effect operates, it
should exert signiﬁcant, positive effects on each of our core- and collateral-dependent
variables.
— Social desirability pressures. This is the tendency for individuals to adjust their own
preferences to conform to the social environment in which they ﬁnd themselves. In the
context of the Deliberative Poll, we use average opinion in each of the small discussion
groups to represent these environments and then use the extent to which the individual
respondent’s views deviate from her or his small-group mean as a measure of the extent
of social desirability pressures. The general hypothesis here is that, for any given
attitude, individuals who score above the small-group mean at wave 1 should reduce
their scores on the attitude by wave 4; and that individuals below the small-group mean
at wave 1 should increase their scores by wave 4. This in turn implies that a variable
that measures above-average scores on a given attitude at wave 1 as deviations from
the small-group mean, but which is otherwise zero, should have a negative effect on
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attitude change between waves 1 and 4. Concomitantly, a variable that measures
below-average scores as deviations from the small-group mean, but which is otherwise
zero, should have a positive effect on attitude change between waves 1 and 4. These
symmetrical social pressure effects are accordingly operationalized below as a pair of
predictor variables – one that measures positive deviations from the group mean and
one that measures negative deviations.
—Articulation of arguments that clarify an individual participant’s thinking. As noted
above, participants were asked to rate the importance of four factors in clarifying their
thinking: the DP documentation provided and the arguments expressed, respectively,
by experts and politicians in the plenary sessions and by fellow participants in informal
discussions. The hypothesis here is that, for each of these possible factors, attitude
change between waves 1 and 4 should be positively and signiﬁcantly affected by the
strength of the perceived clarifying effect.
The possible effects of these various measures on the views of deliberators were
estimated as:
Yt ¼ aþ b0Yt1 þ b1dKnowledgeþ b2Discussion Quality
þ b3 Social Desirability Pressure ðabove group meanÞt
þ b4 Social Desirability Pressure ðbelow group meanÞt
þ b5 Documentationþ b6 Expertsþ b7 Politicians
þ b8 Informal Conversationsþ SðbkXktÞ þ uit; ð2Þ
where Yt is the dependent variable attitude measured at wave 4; Yt21 is the lagged
dependent variable measured at wave 1; dKnowledge is the change in the respondent’s
political knowledge score between waves 1 and 4;33 Discussion Quality is the average
perceived discussion quality of each small-discussion group; Social Desirability Pressuret
is the extent to which the respondent deviates from the small discussion-group mean score
on the issue under consideration, at wave 1; Documentation, Experts, Politicians and
Informal Conversations, respectively, measure the respondents’s perceptions of the
‘clarifying effects’ of each of these factors; Xkt is a set of independent control variables
measured at wave 1; and uit is a random error term. Note that there is now no Test
variable as in Equation 1 because this speciﬁcation relates to deliberators only: the control
group is excluded.
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of estimating Equation 2 for each of our core- and
collateral-dependent variables. To avoid overburdening the reader with detail, the tables do
not report coefﬁcients for the independent control variables even though they were included
in the estimation.34 The estimations cluster the respondents by small-discussion group, to
ensure the correct estimation of (robust) standard errors. Table 8 presents the results for
attitudes towards immigration and climate change. In the immigration position equation
(column 1), the only signiﬁcant mechanism variable is ‘talking informally to other
participants’. The coefﬁcient (b5 0.08) is signiﬁcant and correctly signed. The remaining
coefﬁcients, however, all fail to achieve accepted levels of signiﬁcance. In the immigration
importance equation (column 2), only the Social Desirability (above group mean) coefﬁcient
33 There are other possible ways of specifying and estimating knowledge acquisition effects. See fn. 19
and Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for an analysis of the main alternative speciﬁcations.
34 Dropping these controls from the various speciﬁcations makes no difference to the magnitudes, signs
or signiﬁcance levels of the key explanatory variables.
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(b520.57) is signiﬁcant and correctly signed. In the climate change position equation
(column 3), none of the putative explanatory mechanism variables achieves signiﬁcance at
conventional levels. In the climate change importance model (column 4), the Experts term is
correctly signed and almost signiﬁcant (p5 0.06). The Social Desirability (above group mean)
term is signiﬁcant but is incorrectly signed. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the positive
coefﬁcient of b5 0.12 implies that a climate change position score above the small-group
mean at wave 1 produced an increase in the respondent’s wave 4 score. This clearly
contradicts the idea that social-desirability pressures led respondents to adjust their own
climate change attitudes to the group mean.
These results are obviously disappointing in terms of the extent to which they shed light
on the reasons why Deliberative Polling affects participants’ attitudes. A similar
conclusion is in order in relation to the ﬁndings shown in Table 9, where models for
EU-related attitudes are presented. In the EU Representation equation (column 3), the
Experts term is positive and signiﬁcant in the EU Evaluations equation (column 4) and the
same is true of the Knowledge coefﬁcient. However, in the European Identity and
EU Policy Scope equations (columns 1 and 2 respectively), none of the mechanisms
produces a statistically signiﬁcant effect.
What do these ﬁndings tell us about the possible mechanisms that underpin the effects
of deliberative polling? The brutal conclusion has to be ‘nothing very positive’. The
pattern of signiﬁcant effects across Tables 8 and 9 is far from consistent. The Experts term
features signiﬁcantly in two of the seven equations (for climate change importance and
for EU Representation) while Social Desirability and ‘talking to others’ each appear
correctly signed in only one each (respectively, the immigration importance and position
models).35 It would probably be unreasonable to demand that a given predictor variable
should ﬁgure signiﬁcantly in all seven equations in order to conclude that the mechanism
it represents really does help produce the ‘Deliberative Poll effect’. However, the feeble
pattern of effects that is actually observed in Tables 8 and 9 clearly offers very little
systematic explanation of why the DP effect occurs. Indeed, there are actually three
compelling reasons for concluding that the models presented in Tables 8 and 9 do not
identify the mechanisms responsible for the DP effect. First, there is no obvious
theoretical reason (or set of reasons) why Social Desirability should affect ‘immigration
importance’ while the clarifying effects of talking to others should affect ‘immigration
position’ – rather than, say, vice versa – or why these same variables should leave all
other measured attitudes unaffected. Second, the amount of variation in the respective
dependent variables that is explained by the signiﬁcant mechanisms identiﬁed in Tables 8
and 9 is extremely limited. The tables report the reductions in r2 values that occur if
each signiﬁcant putative mechanism variable is dropped from the speciﬁcation. In all
four instances in which a signiﬁcant effect is thus dropped, the fall in r2 is extremely
modest: by 0.03 (from 0.25 to 0.22) in the immigration-importance equation and by
0.01 in the other three.
The third reason is perhaps the most damning of all. The models in Tables 8 and 9
estimate the effects of nine ‘mechanism coefﬁcients’ across each of eight equations – a
total of seventy-two possible effects. At the p5 0.05 signiﬁcance level, we would expect,
35 The political knowledge term produces no signiﬁcant effects at conventionally accepted levels. This
suggests that there is no systematic tendency for increased knowledge to change DP participants’ attitudes
in terms of either salience or position. This conclusion seems to support Zaller’s claims about the impact
of political knowledge rather than Inglehart’s.
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TABLE 8 Models of Change in Core Immigration and Climate Change Dependent Variables Wave 1 to Wave 4, Deliberators Only
Dependent Variable, Wave 4
Immigration Position Immigration Importance Climate Position Climate Importance
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.
Immigration Position wave 1 0.68 0.000
Immigration Importance wave 1 0.25 0.000
Climate Change Position wave 1 0.50 0.030
Climate Change Importance wave 1 0.32 0.000
Change in Knowledge waves 1–4 20.07 0.181 20.07 0.505 0.03 0.758 20.04 0.375
Group Discussion Quality 0.13 0.245 0.36 0.121 20.01 0.969 20.18 0.301
Social Conformity Pressure (Above) 20.03 0.816 20.57 0.015 20.18 0.367 0.12 0.034
Social Conformity Pressure (Below) 20.10 0.498 20.27 0.167 20.31 0.081 20.00 0.918
Clarify thinking – experts 0.02 0.670 0.05 0.569 0.02 0.876 0.13 0.069
Clarify thinking – politicians 20.01 0.612 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.444 20.02 0.660
Clarify thinking – other participants 0.08 0.036 0.09 0.135 20.04 0.625 20.00 0.959
Clarify thinking – documentation 0.04 0.298 20.12 0.127 0.11 0.163 0.01 0.846
Constant 0.41 0.724 2.38 0.263 2.34 0.429 7.42 0.000
Weighted N 347 347 347 347
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.25 0.19 0.32
Adjusted R2* 0.54 0.22 n/a 0.31
Notes: Controls included but not reported (all measured at wave 1) for Gender, Age, Education, Catholic, Protestant, Working Class,
Religiosity, Left–Right Ideology, Left–Right Squared, Left Party, Right Party.
Data weighted by Gender, Interest in Politics and Education. Standard errors adjusted for twenty-ﬁve clusters (the twenty-ﬁve separate small
discussion groups) in sample.
Social Conformity Pressure (Above) indicates the extent to which, at wave 1, the respondent scored above the mean of the small group of
which s/he was part on the dependent variable in question. Social Conformity Pressure (Below) indicates the equivalent for individuals below
the mean.
Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at p50.05 or better in bold.
*Dropping signiﬁcant non-endogenous predictors.
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TABLE 9 Models of Change in Collateral EU-Related Dependent Variables Wave 1 to Wave 4; Deliberators Only
Dependent Variable, Wave 4
European Identity EU Policy Scope EU Representation EU Evaluations
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.
European Identity, Wave 1 0.69 0.000
EU Policy Scope,Wave 1 0.60 0.001
EU Representation, Wave 1 0.45 0.041
EU Evaluations, Wave 1 0.45 0.000
Change in Knowledge waves 1–4 20.02 0.762 0.08 0.060 20.01 0.856 0.10 0.064
Group Discussion Quality 0.24 0.425 0.05 0.799 20.19 0.176 0.10 0.516
Social Conformity Pressure (Above) 20.28 0.080 20.13 0.570 20.11 0.579 20.20 0.214
Social Conformity Pressure (Below) 20.30 0.205 20.34 0.068 20.13 0.602 0.15 0.382
Clarify thinking – experts 0.12 0.134 20.01 0.903 0.07 0.016 20.05 0.308
Clarify thinking – politicians 20.07 0.346 20.01 0.652 20.02 0.388 0.02 0.715
Clarify thinking – other participants 20.08 0.237 0.03 0.341 0.02 0.566 0.09 0.111
Clarify thinking – documentation 0.03 0.772 0.06 0.146 0.02 0.650 0.06 0.152
Constant 1.20 0.585 20.39 815 2.22 0.166 2.45 0.079
Weighted N 347 347 347 347
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.22 0.24 0.45
Adjusted R2 * n/a n/a 0.23 n/a
Note: Data, weighting, estimation as in Table 8. * Dropping signiﬁcant non-endogenous predictors.
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even if there were no real relationships in the data, to observe one signiﬁcant effect
for every twenty effects estimated. With seventy-two estimated effects, we would therefore
expect, even if there were no ‘real’ effects operating in the data, to observe between three
and four signiﬁcant effects. Viewed in this light, the four signiﬁcant mechanism effects
observed in Tables 8 and 9 look singularly unimpressive. In short, notwithstanding
the efforts made here to identify the mechanisms that underpin the effects of Deliberative
Polling, the broad conclusion suggested by the evidence is that, whatever it is that
produces the observed – and real – DP effect, it is not any of or any combination of
increased knowledge, discussion quality, social-desirability pressure or the clarifying
effects of exposure to documentation, experts, politicians and other DP participants.36
36 One of the surprising features of the analysis presented above, given the ﬁndings of other DP studies,
is the apparent absence of an explanatory role for changes in political knowledge. Previous studies (e.g.
Fishkin and Luskin, ‘Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal’; Fishkin and Luskin, ‘Broadcasts of
Deliberative Polls’; Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, ‘Considered Opinions’) have found that increases in
knowledge constitute an important part of the DP effect on participants’ attitudes. It could be argued that
the lack of knowledge-effects observed here results more from a failure of model speciﬁcation than from a
lack of ‘real effects’. There are two important ways in which the speciﬁcation and estimation of possible
knowledge effects here differs from those used in other studies.
First, increases in knowledge here are captured explicitly in terms of observed individual-level change,
rather than in terms of the ‘implied change’ that results from the use of a lagged dependent variable
model. In ‘Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls’, Fishkin and Luskin argue that post-test knowledge level is
the best proxy for knowledge change. Here, this would imply that knowledge change could best be
measured using the level of knowledge at wave 4 rather than the change in knowledge between waves 1
and 4. The use of this term ‘level’ is typically justiﬁed on the grounds that people with high knowledge at
time 1 by deﬁnition cannot increase their knowledge level at time t2 as much as can people with low
knowledge at time t1. Moreover, with a lagged dependent variable this ‘level of knowledge at wave 4’
speciﬁcation can in any case be regarded as capturing the implied effects of knowledge change. However, it
should be noted that this is only the modelled effect of change – not the actual effect of observed individual
change. In any event, substituting ‘wave 4 level of knowledge’ for the ‘change in knowledge between waves
1 and 4’ in the models reported in Tables 8 and 9 produces virtually identical results to those reported in
those two tables. Using the ‘level of knowledge at wave 4’ speciﬁcations, the knowledge term fails to
produce a signiﬁcant effect for almost all the dependent variables examined here. The only exception is in
the immigration importance equation, where the knowledge term produces a signiﬁcant (but negative)
effect. All of this suggests that the use of an explicit knowledge change measure in Tables 8 and 9 does not
mask effects that would be otherwise revealed if an implicit change (wave 4 level) measure were
used instead.
A second way in which knowledge effects could be speciﬁed and estimated is to regard them as interaction
effects rather than as simple direct effects. This is the approach taken in Fishkin and Luskin’s ‘Broadcasts of
Deliberative Polls’. The intuition is that the effects of knowledge acquisition on attitudes vary according to
the levels of other explanatory variables in the model. Thus, for example, it might be expected that the
effects of inceased knowledge on people’s climate change positions will be greater if there is a relatively high
(as opposed to a relatively low) level of small group discussion quality. The logic of this approach is that we
should be more interested in the effects of the interactions between knowledge and each of the other
explanatory variables in the model than in the direct ‘main’ effects of increased knowledge itself. This
approach is tested explicity in the results reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. The tables are
based on the ‘full’ model speciﬁcations as shown in Tables 8 and 9, but with all possible interactions between
knowledge change and the core explanatory variables added to the models. The tables report the results for
the interaction effects only. (The pattern of ‘main’ effects remains virtually identical to that reported in
Tables 8 and 9.) The results lend little credence to the idea that knowledge change effects can be discerned
using this interaction approach. Across the two tables, only four out of ﬁfty-six possible knowledge
interaction effects are statistically signiﬁcant – barely more than would be expected on the basis of chance
alone. This again suggests that it is not the particular model speciﬁcation design adopted here that is
somehow masking the ‘real’ ‘knowledge acquisition’ mechanism that underpins the DP effect.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Deliberative Polling is a specialized form of social scientiﬁc enquiry that is increasingly
being used by public authorities and policy makers to inform their decision making. The
research enterprise analysed here constituted a classic Deliberative Poll. It involved
comparing the changing views of a randomly selected group of deliberators with those of
a randomly selected control group of non-deliberators. Since both the deliberating test
group and the non-deliberating control group were designed to be representative of the
population of the European Union, the results should in principle be generalizable to the
population of the European Union as a whole. The core result was that deliberation over
two important EU-wide issues – immigration and climate change – did indeed change the
views of the deliberating test group. In comparison with the control group, deliberators,
perhaps unsurprisingly, attached increased importance to the two issues after the DP event.
Deliberators also, on average, became more liberal on the question of immigration – they
became more tolerant of immigrants – and more green on the issue of climate change – they
became more prepared to accept policies to combat climate change even though they might
damage the economy. There was also a collateral DP effect on deliberators’ views about the
European Union itself: they increased their sense of European identity; they felt increasingly
satisﬁed with democracy at the EU level; and they developed more positive evaluations of the
European Union itself. Again, given that the DP event had brought together participants
from all over the European Union in a friendly, well-organized and congenial atmosphere,
perhaps this collateral effect might be thought unsurprising.
That the Deliberative Poll produced this kind of result, with signiﬁcant attitude change
associated with the test group but with not the control group, is consistent with the
ﬁndings of previous such Polls. The substantive implication here is that EU policy makers
could probably assume that, if there were more public deliberation on the issues of
immigration and climate change, European public opinion would be more liberal and
greener than it is at present. But is this implication justiﬁed? The second, and most
important, part of the analysis conducted here involved trying to assess what the actual
mechanisms of attitude change among the deliberators might be. Our analysis of the
comparison between the test and control groups showed that weighting and clustering the
data and controlling for a range of theoretically relevant demographic and other dispositional
variables continued to produce ﬁndings consistent with a strong ‘DP test’ effect. Taken
together, these ﬁndings suggest, however, that it is not the distinctive character of the
deliberators themselves that produces this DP effect. Our analysis then went on to make use
of the individual-level and group-level variance in key measures associated exclusively with
the test group. This stage of the analysis involved testing four further hypotheses about the
possible mechanisms that could account for the deliberators’ changing attitudes: increased
knowledge, discussion/deliberation quality, social conformity pressure and the role of
documents, experts, politicians and other participants in clarifying people’s thinking. The key
ﬁnding in this connection is that none of these hypothesized alleged mechanisms successfully
explained why deliberators changed their views during the deliberative process. A small
number of the putative mechanisms appeared to have signiﬁcant statistical effects in a small
number of very limited contexts, but these statistical effects were fragmented and so
infrequent as to be consistent with random variations in the data.
This leaves the observed ‘effects’ of deliberation almost entirely unexplained. The
analysis shows what seems not to matter – knowledge, discussion quality, group
conformity and the role of other actors in clarifying thinking – but it does not show what
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does matter. On the face of it, this appears a very negative conclusion. But it is nonetheless
an important one. The ﬁctional detective Sherlock Holmes allegedly claimed that when all
the plausible explanations of a crime have been eliminated then only the implausible remain.
The analogy here is that if individual-level and group-level explanations comprehensively
fail to identify the underlying mechanisms of the DP effect then we need to look elsewhere.
One possibility that perhaps needs to be considered systematically in the course of future
DP studies is that, even though there may be no small-group social desirability effects
in Deliberative Polling, there may be present a much larger, event-level social-desirability
effect. DP events are generally organized by liberal-minded academics and like-minded
collaborators, who undoubtedly strive to be as neutral as possible in their dealings with DP
participants. It is conceivable that unintentionally this liberal, even slightly left-of-centre
ethos pervades DP events. The strong collateral effects of increased sympathy for the
European Union that were observed in this study are certainly consistent with the idea that
the ethos of the 2009 event and the character of organizers themselves may have had
unintended, diffuse effects on deliberators’ attitudes. There is clearly scope for the
construction of an experimental DP design that consciously attempted to vary the overall
presentational ethos of otherwise identical DP events. Any differences in observed outcomes
under experimental conditions such as those would provide a powerful insight into the
possible explanation of the DP effect. It might turn out that the observed ‘DP effect’ was not
a DP effect at all but a DP-event effect, that the key causal variable was not the process of
deliberation itself, but the style, values and outlook of those organizing the deliberation.
There are certainly precedents for such ﬁndings in other social science research.
Finally, and more optimistically, it should be stressed that the experiment reported here
was only one of a wider set of experiments conducted as part of the Europolis
Deliberative Poll. The analysis here has focused solely on the comparisons that can be
made across waves 1 and 4 of the Europolis data and across the narrowly deﬁned test and
control groups. The broad conclusion that must be drawn from the analysis reported here
(with the possible exception of Zaller’s observations about knowledge acquistion and
attitude reinforcement) is that the mechanisms of attitude change at the Europolis DP
event have yet to be identiﬁed. This said, further analysis of the much more detailed
measures that were collected during waves 2 and 3 of the DP event may well reveal far
more about the character of and causal mechanisms underlying attitude change among
its participants.
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